Did Korekiyo Takahashi Rescue Japan from the Great Depression? by Cha, Myung Soo
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Did Korekiyo Takahashi Rescue Japan from the Great
Depression?






RightċİĺĪļĺĺİĶĵ ėĨķĬĹ ĚĬĹİĬĺ Ĉ ĕĶõúĀü
ċİī ĒĶĹĬĲİŀĶ ěĨĲĨįĨĺįİ ęĬĺĪļĬ đĨķĨĵ ċİī ĒĶĹĬĲİŀĶ ěĨĲĨįĨĺįİ ęĬĺĪļĬ đĨķĨĵ ċİī ĒĶĹĬĲİŀĶ ěĨĲĨįĨĺįİ ęĬĺĪļĬ đĨķĨĵ ċİī ĒĶĹĬĲİŀĶ ěĨĲĨįĨĺįİ ęĬĺĪļĬ đĨķĨĵ
ĭĹĶĴ ĻįĬ ĎĹĬĨĻ ċĬķĹĬĺĺİĶĵĆ ĭĹĶĴ ĻįĬ ĎĹĬĨĻ ċĬķĹĬĺĺİĶĵĆ ĭĹĶĴ ĻįĬ ĎĹĬĨĻ ċĬķĹĬĺĺİĶĵĆ ĭĹĶĴ ĻįĬ ĎĹĬĨĻ ċĬķĹĬĺĺİĶĵĆ
ĔŀļĵĮ ĚĶĶ ĊįĨ
ïěįĬ ĐĵĺĻİĻļĻĬ Ķĭ ČĪĶĵĶĴİĪ ęĬĺĬĨĹĪįó ďİĻĶĻĺļĩĨĺįİ ĜĵİĽĬĹĺİĻŀ
Ĩĵī ċĬķĨĹĻĴĬĵĻ Ķĭ ČĪĶĵĶĴİĪĺó ĠĬļĵĮĵĨĴ ĜĵİĽĬĹĺİĻŀð




Did Korekiyo Takahashi Rescue Japan 
from the Great Depression?* 
 
 
September 30, 2000 
 






Korekiyo Takahashi  is remembered as a wise finance minister saving Japan from the 
Great Depression, but the role of his policy remains to be rigorously measured, with 
proper control for other forces also driving the recovery.  Vector autoregression 
analysis of previously unexploited monthly data indicates that while Takahashi’s fiscal 
expansion was  critical in reversing the downswing, the  subsequent  upswing was 
sustained by industrial policy promoted by  “new bureaucrats” as well as by world 
recovery.  The rise of fascism also aided the rebound by creating a political setting, 
which generated downward wage shocks.   
 
*  Visiting Fellow, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 
Japan and Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Yeungnam University, 
Kyungsan, South Korea.  I am particularly grateful to Osamu Saito for inviting me to 
the Institute of Economic Research of Hitotsubashi University, where I could obtain 
most of time series data used in this paper.  Parts of the data were also made available 
to me by Jinsung Chung.  I also thank Jean Pascal Bassino, Hyung Gu Lynn, Neil 
Rollings and Peter Temin for thought-provoking comments.   All remaining errors are 
mine.   2
After half a century of rapid growth and industrialization following the Meiji 
restoration, Japan entered a decade of stagnation with the end of the First World War.  
A series of supply and demand shocks contributed to the recession of the 1920s, 
including among others a devastating earthquake in 1923, the interwar agricultural 
depression, financial crisis of 1927, and deflationary expectations resulting from the 
anticipated return to the gold standard.
1  Finally came the Great Depression, to which 
Japan responded by returning to the gold standard from January 1930, a policy response 
likened by a contemporary industrialist to “opening a window in the middle of a 
typhoon.”  The depression however proved relatively mild and short: Japan’s economy 
stopped contracting in 1931 and subsequently resumed to grow at an unusually rapid 
pace.   
Given that Japan left the gold standard relatively early (December 1931), its 
superior macroeconomic performance after 1929 can be seen as an additional piece of 
evidence corroborating the gold standard theory of the Great Depression as proposed by 
Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin.
2  I start in the following section by showing that 
the early departure from the gold standard accounts for only a part of the Japanese 
recovery: not only was Japan’s depression shorter, but also the following recovery was 
                                                                 
1 See Nakamura, “Keiki Hendo to Keizai Seisaku.”  Faini and Toniolo, 
“Reconsidering Japan’s Deflation” stressed the impact of deflation expectation.  For a 
detailed account of 1927 financial crisis, see Takahashi and Morigaki, Showa Kinyu 
Kyokoshi.   
2 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression, 
Eichengreen and Temin, “The Gold Standard and the Great Depression.”   3
considerably more rapid than in other countries leaving gold in the same year as Japan.   
A majority of  previous studies,  briefly reviewed in the following section, 
attributes the early and rapid recovery to the policies implemented by Korekiyo 
Takahashi, the  Finance Minister of Japan from December 1931 to February 1936.  
While much of the literature is narrative accounts, quantitative studies are not entirely 
successful in making their case in a convincing way.  Most importantly, in highlighting 
Takahashi’s role, they failed to properly take into consideration and control for other 
influences that might also have driven the Japanese recovery.  A nd different studies put 
emphasis upon different element(s) of Takahashi’s three measures: depreciation, fiscal 
expansion, and easy money.  Finally, there is a minority view that the recovery forces 
really came from the private sector.   
Therefore, the causes of Japan’s recovery are an unsettled issue, and the impact of 
the policy measures taken by “Japan’s Keynes” remains to be rigorously measured, with 
proper control for other shocks also leading to the recovery.  As the literature review 
reveals, these other factors included the world recovery and the rise of an authoritarian 
control.  The rise of fascism and the military in the wake of the Manchurian invasion 
of 1931 may have aided recovery significantly in Japan by exerting downward pressure 
upon wages, as in Nazi Germany.
3  “New bureaucrats (shinkanryo),” the other pillar of 
the new regime, expanded administrative control over the economy and launched 
industrial policy in the form of “heavy and chemical industrialization” drive, generating 
                                                                 
3 Temin, “Socialism and Wages in the Recovery from the Great Depression in the 
United States and Germany.”   4
substantial investment demand stimuli.  As compared with the influence of the world 
recovery and the economic consequences of the political regime shift, h ow important 
was Takahashi’s policy intervention for Japan’s recovery from the Great Depression?  
Which of Takahashi’s policy measures mattered most?  Such are the questions I ask in 
this paper.   
I address these questions by applying vector autoregression analysis to previously 
unexploited monthly data, as described in the second section.  Vector autoregression 
allows decomposing the Japanese output growth in the 1930s into different parts 
attributable to different shocks, which included Takahashi’s policy measures, as well as 
world recovery and the anti-labor and industrial policy.  Figures plotting the movement 
of these components provide a convenient means to show which shock mattered when 
and how much.  These graphs, presented in the third section, indicate that behind the 
façade of single event of the Japanese recovery lay the operation of diverse shocks 
occurring in succession  with differing intensity.  Takahashi’s fiscal expansion was 
uniquely important in reversing the downswing, and the depreciating yen after going off 
gold also helped.  Downward wage shocks occurred to boost the economy significantly 
in the early 1930s, which was followed by an investment boom in the mid-1930s.   T he 
world recovery consistently sustained the Japanese growth from mid-1932.   
Final section summarizes and concludes.   
 
The Great Depression and Recovery in Japan 
   5
According to the gold standard theory of the Great Depression, both the severity 
of the depression and the vigor of the subsequent recovery depended upon how early a 
country abandoned the gold standard.  As long as the gold convertibility of currency 
remained the predominant policy goal, the room for bold reflationary measures was 
severely limited, as these policies would create large balance of payments deficits and 
lead to rapid depletion of gold stock.  Removal of the external constraint being a 
necessary precondition for implementing expansionary policies, the earlier the departure 
from the gold standard, the faster was the recovery likely to be, and vice versa.   
Figure 1 bears out this story: the ranking in the level of industrial production index 
in 1937 matches the sequence of going off gold in the wake of the Depression: Britain, 
Germany and Japan in 1931, the U.S. in 1933, and finally France in 1936.    Figure 1 
also  shows Japan revived earlier to grow faster than the two European countries, 
although Japan abandoned the gold standard several months after both Germany and 
Britain.  Using a richer panel data set, Ben Bernanke and Harold James showed the 
rate of the Japanese contraction in 1930-31 (8%) was smaller than average rate of 
contraction for those countries leaving the gold standard in 1931 (16%).  And while 
most of those countries leaving the gold standard in 1931 had to wait until 1933 to see 
industrial production rebound, Japan’s industrial production index resumed growth in 
1932.  Finally, Japan’s growth rate from 1932-36 (62%) was substantially above not 
only the world average, but also the average for those countries leaving gold in the same   6
year as Japan (45%).
4 
Japan’s early and rapid recovery has repeatedly been attributed in different studies 
to 1) the yen depreciation, 2) fiscal expansion, and 3) easy money following  the 
decision by  the Finance Minister Takahashi to take J apan off gold.  Each of these 
studies highlighted different element(s) of Takahashi’s policy regime as the prime 
mover in the recovery process.  The relative importance of each of Takahashi’s three 
policy measures in bringing about the growth however has n ever been properly 
evaluated.  More importantly, it has been neither unanimously agreed upon nor 
rigorously established that Takahashi’s policy measures were indeed crucial in 
generating the vigorous upswing of the 1930s, controlling for the influence of other 
shocks also driving the recovery.   
Introducing Korekiyo Takahashi to English-speaking economists, Dick Nanto and 
Shinji Takagi used Granger-causality tests to show that both yen/dollar exchange rate 
and real central government spending had significant impacts upon the level of activity, 
while real private investment had little causal effect.  And Yasukichi Yasuba also drew 
attention to the role of increased spending for poor relief and militarization in the 
recovery, a conclusion based upon a larger coefficient estimate for public consumption 
in his ordinary least squares estimation of a simplified form of national income identity.  
Toru Iwami, Tetsuji Okazaki and Hiroshi Yoshikawa concluded that Takahashi’s three 
policy measures were equally important, a judgment derived from inspection of graphs 
                                                                 
4 See Bernanke and James, “The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the 
Great Depression: An International Comparison,” p. 45, Table 2.4.   7
charting aggregate time series data  and ordinary least squares estimation of a few 
structural equations.  Finally, Masanori Okura and Juro Teranishi stressed the impact 
of devaluation and deficit financing, indicating the relative ineffectiveness of monetary 
expansion.  To reach this conclusion, they carried out simulations using a system of 
structural equations estimated using ordinary least squares method.
5   
While a majority of existing studies place emphasis upon effective policy response 
to deflationary shocks transmitted from abroad, there are others who believe that the 
recovery was initiated by the private sector.  Using an input-output table of Japan for 
1935, Norio Tominaga found that the impact of public consumption upon output was 
significantly weaker than exports and investment demand.  Showing evidence of 
reviving private investment in the early 1930s, Kinzo Shima argued Japan’s recovery 
was led by the private sector.
6  Finally, the mildness of Japan’s depression was 
attributed by various scholars to wage flexibility, which was in turn related to the 
presence of a sizable traditional sector in a “dual structured” labor market.
7    
                                                                 
5 Nanto and Takagi, “Korekiyo Takahashi and Japanese Recovery from the Great 
Depression,” p. 373, Yasuba, “The Japanese Economy and Economic Policy in the 
1930s,” Iwami, Okazaki and Yoshikawa, “The Great Depression in Japan: Why Was It 
So Short?”  Okura and Teranishi, “Exchange Rate and Economic Recovery of Japan in 
the 1930s.” 
6 Tominaga, “1932-36 nenkan no Nihon Keizai,” Shima, “Iwayuru ‘Takahashi Zaisei’ 
ni tsuite,”   
7 Sato, “Senganki Nihon no Makuro Keizai to Mikuro Keizai,” Yasuba, “The Japanese 
Economy and Economic Policy,” p. 142, Okazaki, “Senzenki Nihon no Keiki Junkan to 
Kakaku Suryo Chosei.”   D rawing attention to Japan’s price volatility and output   8
Even if the crucial role of Takahashi’s policies in reversing the downturn is 
admitted, it seems unlikely that his expansionary measures alone drove the rapid output 
growth up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937.  For one thing, most 
of the devaluation occurred in 1932 and 1933, and then the value of yen began to 
stabilize.  Also the conventional story has it that when the worst seemed over, 
Takahashi began to be concerned about inflation and tried to revert to stabilization.  
Reducing expenditure, he attempted to put an end to debt financing, at the same time 
urging the Bank of Japan to absorb money supplied in the course of debt monetization.  
In the standard historical account, the policy reversal eventually prompted the military 
to decide to kill him in February 1936.
8  While these strongly suggest that the 
economic growth after the early 1930s was likely to have been propelled largely by 
causes other than the Keynesian policy measures, the non-Takahashi factors could have 
been important in reversing the downswing in the early 1930s as well. 
There were at l east three important non-Takahashi shocks, which are mentioned 
but not adequately taken into account and controlled for in the previous studies.  One 
was the recovery in the rest of the world, providing Japan export demand stimuli on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
stability in the pre-WWI Japanese business cycles, Takafusa Nakamura hinted at the 
classical nature of the Japanese economy during the Meiji period.  Nakamura, “Meijiki 
no Keiki Hendo” and “Keiki Hendo to Keizai Seisaku,” pp. 304-5. More recently, 
however, Hiroshi Yoshikawa found evidence for nominal wage rigidity in interwar 
Japan.  See Yoshikawa, “Senzen Nihon Keizai no Makuro Bunseki.”  On dualistic 
structure of the interwar Japanese labor market, see Odaka, “Nijukozo.” 
8 Nakamura, “Keiki Hendo,” p. 307.   9
top of the effect  of the yen depreciation.  Second, as in many other countries, a 
consequence of the Great Depression was that the liberal policy regime of the 1920s 
became discredited and state interventionism gained force in Japan.  The shift in policy 
regime was pioneered by “new bureaucrats (shinkanryo).”  D isillusioned with corrupt 
party politics and the instability of market economy as witnessed during the 1920s, 
these reform-minded technocrats wanted to establish a system of control to replace 
market system.
9  The transition found one expression in the legislation of the Major 
Industries Control Law ( Juyo Sangyo Toseiho) in 1931.  While the law was not 
intended to impose direct state control over, but to encourage “cooperation” among, 
firms in designated “important industries” by forming depression cartels, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry remained in a position to influence investment decisions and 
output- and price-fixing agreements.  More importantly, during the 1930s various laws 
were introduced to promote specific (mostly “heavy and chemical”) industries, notably 
the Petroleum Industry Law of 1934 and the Automobile Manufacturing Law of 1936.  
The  “heavy and chemical industrialization” drive not only stimulated  investment 
activity and thus contributed to the recovery, but also was welcomed by the military, 
which has been demanding persistently to get prepared for a war to consolidate control 
over China since the Manchurian invasion.
10   
                                                                 
9  See Berger, Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931-1941.  Chalmers Johnson termed 
this shift in policy regime as the “rise of industrial policy.”  See his MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle, chapter 3. 
10 Nakamura, Senzenki Nihon Keizai Seicho no Bunseki, p. 208, Suzuku, Showa 
Kyokoshi, p. 186.   10 
The third and final factor concerns the labor market.  Peter Temin explained the 
difference in the speed of recovery between the U.S. and Germany in the 1930s in terms 
of contrasting policies towards the labor market.  In the U.S., labor unions were 
encouraged under the New Deal, and other labor protection laws were introduced, 
raising real wages.  Exogenous wage rises shifted the aggregate supply curve to the left, 
reducing employment and output.  In Germany, the opposite occurred.  The Nazis 
destroyed labor unions quickly after taking power, and the government intervened in the 
process of wage bargaining, exerting downward pressures upon the level of wages.
11 
Japan in the 1930s resembled Germany more than the U.S.  The Great 
Depression killed not only the classical liberalism in the sphere of economic policy, but 
also Japan’s nascent democracy (known as the “Taisho democracy”).  As the 
unemployment rate rose, the demand to put an end to Prime Minister Hamaguchi’s 
deflation to keep Japan on gold at the expense of internal equilibrium turned into the 
rejection of bipartisan politics.  A  right-wing terrorist shot Hamaguchi in November 
1930, causing his eventual death in August 1931.  In September, the Manchurian 
Incident made it clear that the military was getting out of civilian control.  With the 
collapse of the rule of Hamaguchi’s Minseito party in December election, Korekiyo 
Takahashi was appointed as the Finance Minister of the new Seiyukai party cabinet.  
                                                                 
11 Temin, “Socialism and Wages.”  Weinstein argued that the rise in nominal wages 
under New Deal impeded the recovery of the U.S. economy from the depression.  See 
Weinstein, “Some Macroeconomic Impacts of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
1933-1935.”   11 
Two fatal attacks were carried out in 1932, killing Junnosuke Inoue (the Finance 
Minister in Hamaguchi’s cabinet) in February and Tsuyoshi Inukai (the Prime Minister 
of Seiyukai cabinet) in May.    Thus ended Japan’s brief experiment with parliamentary 
politics, and the military began to take over the cabinet.
12 
In the new political environment created by the Manchurian invasion and the 
rightwing terrorist attacks, both independent unions and proletarian parties suffered a 
serious setback.  Unionization rate declined from a peak in 1931, and the number of 
workers in labor disputes as a proportion of total  also  fell.
13    The Home Ministry 
abandoned its liberal labor policy of the 1920s and (together with the military) began to 
promote rightwing (“Japanist”) forces surfacing at the grass roots from the mid-1920s.  
Destroying mainstream unions, the Japanist groups expanded to the point of organizing 
the National Defense Fund Labor Association in early 1933.  “At factories throughout 
the nation in the winter of 1933, an estimated 80,000 union workers and 20,000 
non-union employees agreed to work on a Sunday or holiday and donate that day’s 
wages to the army’s National Defense Fund Drive.”
14  Under such circumstances, the 
real wages declined, a phenomenon  not observed either in Nazi Germany and or in 
                                                                 
12 For details see Berger, “Politics and Mobilization in Japan, 1931-45,” pp.105-17. The 
coup in 1936 (known as the February 26 Incident), during which Takahashi was 
murdered, finalized the transition to military rule 
13 Unionization rate fell from the peak of 8% in 1931 to zero in 1940. Flath, The 
Japanese Economy, p.78.   For declining incidence of labor disputes, see Nakamura 
and Odaka, “Gaiaisetsu,” p. 35, figure 108.     
14  Gordon, Labor Union and Imperial Democracy, chapters 9 and 10.  The quote is   12 
fascist Italy.
15    Those who identified downward wage flexibility may in fact have been 
observing the operation of the wage shocks. 
To summarize, at least six different types of structural shocks need to be reckoned 
with to establish the causes of Japan’s early and rapid recovery from the Great 
Depression in a convincing way.  One comes from the supply side, while the other five 
are demand shocks.  The supply shock refers to wage shocks compressing wages 
during the 1930s, which occurred in the transition from democracy to fascism.  In 
parallel with this transition, the Japanese economy was being transformed from market 
to command system, controlled by bureaucrats.  They launched industrial policy in the 
form of “heavy and chemical industrialization” drive, generating domestic investment 
demand shocks.  Three of the remaining four demand shocks were related to Korekiyo 
Takahashi’s well-known policies: public spending and money supply shocks, and 
exchange rate shocks after the shift to floating exchange regime.  Finally, there were 
world output shocks, affecting Japan’s export demand.   
 
A Vector Autoregression Analysis with Monthly Data 
 
To measure the role of these factors in the Japanese recovery from the Great 
Depression, I apply vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to previously unexploited 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
from page 277. 
15 Eichengreen & Hatton, “Introduction,” p.15, Table 1.3; Mattesini and Quintieri, 
“Italy and the Great Depression,” p. 281.     13 
monthly macroeconomic time series data.  The VAR system has six variables, which 
include 1) world output, 2) exports volume from Japan, 3) real deficits of the Japanese 
government, 4) high-powered money supplied by the Bank of Japan, 5) Japanese 
industrial production, and 6) the real wage in Japan.
16  All series are de-seasonalized 
and then log-transformed before estimation.  Sample period runs from January 1930 to 
September 1936, which is dictated by data availability: industrial production index 
began to be compiled by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry from January 1930, 
and Mattesini and Quintieri’s world production index ends in September 1936.  Given 
that unit root test results indicate only real government deficits series is stationary (see 
appendix), the remaining five variables are first-differenced.  Lag length tests showed 
four lags are optimal.   
Residuals obtained from the estimation of the six-variable VAR are surprises not 
explained by past changes in the variables included.  These are known as reduced form 
shocks, as they are functions of structural shocks, therefore their economic meaning is 
difficult to decipher.  Hence the second stage of analysis is required, where structural 
shocks are recovered from the reduced form shocks by imposing assumptions on how 
the reduced form and structural shocks are related.  The assumptions I introduce can be 
expressed by the following set of six equations, which say in short that the six variables 
differ in the degree of exogeneity.   
 
                                                                 
16 For sources of data, see data appendix.   14 
ef  =                                  ef                   (1) 
ex  = a1 ef    +                         ee                   (2) 
eg  = a2 ef  + a3 ex  +                    eg                   (3) 
em  = a4 ef  + a5 ex +  a 6 eg +               em                  (4) 
ey  = a7 ef  + a8 ex +  a 9 eg + a10 em   +       ed                 (5) 
ew  = a11 ef  + a12 ex + a13 eg + a14 em + a15 ey +   ew                 (6). 
 
Here reduced form shocks are represented by vector e = (ef, ex, eg, em, ey, ew), and 
e = ( ef, ee,  eg, em, ed, ew) is a vector of the six structural shocks  identified in the 
preceding section: foreign output shock, exchange rate shock, fiscal shock, money 
supply shock, domestic demand shock (other than money supply and public spending 
shocks), and wage shock. 
Equation (1), making the world output the most exogenous of the six variables by 
relating the surprise component in world output (ef) solely to world output shocks (ef), 
models interwar Japan as a small open economy.  Next comes the export volume, 
whose surprise component (ee) is contemporaneously related to the world output shocks 
as well as to exchange rate shocks (ee) in equation (2).
17  The real government deficits 
                                                                 
17 Exchange rate is not explicitly included as a variable in the VAR system, because 
sufficient data were not available to calculate monthly real effective exchange rates for 
Japan.  While the real exchange rate between the dollar (or the pound sterling) and yen 
can readily be derived, this cannot be considered as an adequate index for the true real 
effective exchange rate for yen.  For Japan’s overseas trade was well diversified in 
terms of geography.  Japan’s trade with the U.S. or Britain accounted for only a small   15 
is treated as the third most exogenous variable, given that Takahashi’s fiscal expansion 
in the early 1930s can be seen as responding to shocks transmitted from the w orld 
economy via the trade channel.  Also the two shocks can have  contemporaneous 
impact upon the real deficit by affecting the level of output, hence tax revenue.  The 
fiscal expansion was financed largely by public debt issued and taken over by the Bank 
of Japan, an observation leading me to put money supply in the fourth place in the 
ordering of variables.
18  In a standard Keynesian model with sticky nominal wages, the 
output and real wage are endogenously and simultaneously determined, which makes it 
nonsensical to try to differentiate the two variables in terms of level of exogeneity.  I 
tried two different systems, i.e. one where output comes before wage and the other with 
the opposite ordering, and obtained similar results, as reported below. 
Now the coefficient matrix relating the reduced form to structural shocks can be 
readily obtained by Choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of 
reduced form shocks.  Structural shocks can be obtained by pre-multiplying the 
reduced form shocks with  the inverse of the coefficient matrix.  Pre-multiplying the 
coefficient matrix with reduced form vector moving average (VMA) expression 
(obtained by the inverting VAR expression) gives structural form VMA expression, 
which relates the six variables to present and past structural shocks.  Now  first 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
part of the total volume of trade, and far more important for Japan’s overseas trade was 
Asia, which included not only China and India, but also the “yen bloc,” comprising 
Japan’s formal colonies and sphere of influence.  See Nakamura, “Keiki Hendo,” 
p.310, Table 6-13. 
18 Shima, “Iwagyuru ‘Takahashi Zaisei’ ni tsuite,” pp. 102-7.   16 
difference of the Japanese output can be decomposed into six components attributable to 
each of the six distinct structural shocks. For instance, one can recover the part in 
monthly change in output due solely to the money supply shock by setting the present 
and past values of other structural shocks than money supply shock equal to zero in 
structural VMA expression for output.   Accumulation of this money supply 
component shows how the level of output would have fluctuated had only money supply 
shocks been generated. 
 
Impulse Response and Output Decomposition 
 
Estimated coefficients are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  Estimated Coefficients 
Coefficients  Estimated Values 
a1  0.50 (0.04) 
a2  0.64 (0.16) 
a3  -0.94 (0.05) 
a4  0.16 (0.01) 
a5  -0.02 (0.00) 
a6s  0.01 (0.00) 
a7  0.22 (0.01) 
a8  0.22 (0.00) 
a9  0.03 (0.00) 
a10  0.11 (0.01) 
a11  -0.17 (0.01)   17 
a12  -0.05 (0.01) 
a13  -0.00 (0.00) 
a14  -0.26 (0.01) 
a15  -0.03 (0.01) 
Note: Parenthetically shown are standard errors, calculated using maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure. 
   
The estimated coefficients are  all significant at 5% level, and their signs are 
consistent with a Keynesian model with nominal wage rigidity.  The two coefficients 
in equation (3) have opposite signs, but  positive a 2 is outweighed by negative a 3, 
indicating that the Japanese fiscal policy in the 1930s was countercyclical.  Not only is 
a3 larger than a2 in absolute value, but also the variance of surprise component of export 
volume series (ee) is about ten times as large as the variance of world output surprise 
(ef).
19  In equation (4), the monetization of deficit financing is confirmed by a positive 
a6.  The positive coefficients in equation (5) indicate different types of positive 
aggregate demand shocks led to output expansion.  Aggregate demand shifters 
influence real wages in a negative way in equation (6), indicating the presence of 
nominal wage rigidity.   
In Figure 2 are shown the  responses of the more endogenous half of the six 
variables -- money, output, and real wages -- to one standard deviation structural shocks 
over three years (thirty six months).  Reading the first column across rows, one finds 
                                                                 
19 Also the restriction that a2 equals zero passes over-identification test (chi-square(1) = 
0.22), while the restriction of zero a3 is rejected (chi-square(1) = 4.81) .   18 
indications of accommodating monetary policy in the responses of the money supply to 
six structural shocks.  Not only did money supply finance expansionary fiscal policy, 
but also it adapted to variations in money demand, reflecting the fluctuations in the level 
of activity due to other types of demand shocks and wage shocks.  The patterns of 
output responses (shown as the second column) are consistent with the predictions of a 
standard Keynesian model with sticky nominal wages: positive aggregate demand 
shocks raises output, while shocks pushing up wage lowers it.  The pattern of output 
response to money shock is less clear, which seems to be attributable to the fact that 
money supply shock begins to take effect with a considerable lag.
20  Finally, in the 
Keynesian model rightward shifts in the aggregate demand schedule reduce the real 
wages by raising price level, which is confirmed by response of real wages to world 
output, real deficits, and money shocks in Figure 2.  This again shows that the interwar 
Japanese economy was not characterized by perfect wage flexibility. 
Having retrieved structural shocks and estimated impulse responses, I now 
proceed to the decomposition of output growth in the 1930s into six parts due to the six 
structural shocks.  Figure 3 shows the fluctuations of the six components from the base 
of December 1931, when the Japanese industrial production index fell to its lowest level 
(900) since it had hit a bottom (823) in March 1931.   Panel A shows two hypothetical 
paths of output fluctuations, which would have occurred only  if either  world output 
shocks (solid line) or exchange rate shocks (broken line) had been present.  The world 
                                                                 
20 Gali, “How well does the IS-LM model fit postwar U.S. data?” p. 714.   19 
output shock component shows that deflationary shocks continued to be transmitted to 
Japan from the rest of the world until mid-1932, when the world as a whole entered 
upon a recovery path, starting to support Japan’s recovery until the end of the sample 
period.  On the other hand, the beneficial impact of the yen depreciation following the 
departure from the gold standard in December 1931 was largely exhausted during 1932.  
Adding up the two graphs vertically in mind, one can visualize the net effect of the 
external demand and exchange rate shocks, which would indicate that using 
depreciation Japan could insulate itself only partially from the world downswing until 
the mid-1932.  Measured either in terms of the contribution to the output growth from 
December 1931 to September 1936 or in terms of the volatility, exchange rate shocks 
appear as a substantially weaker force than world output shocks.   
Panel B shows the two hypothetical courses of output fluctuations, which are 
attributable to deficit spending and monetary policy shocks, respectively.  The fiscal 
shock component rises rapidly until the early 1934 and then falls, both indicating the 
important role played by Takahashi’s fiscal expansion in reversing the downturn, and 
confirming the subsequent shift to a conservative fiscal policy.  On the other hand, the 
money shock component fluctuates around a weakly downward trend: once the changes 
in money supply due to the debt monetization are controlled for, monetary policy of the 
Bank of Japan turns out to be contractionary.  As Eigo Fukai, the then governor of the 
Bank of Japan, recollects, taking over increasing amount of government bonds and 
becoming increasingly concerned about its inflationary consequences, the Bank of   20 
Japan set upon soaking up liquidity via open market operations.
21   
Turning to Panel C, one finds positive impact of wage shocks upon output in late 
1932 and 1933, which however was not sustained in the following years.  This is 
consistent with Andrew Gordon’s account of the fluctuating fortunes of the Japanese 
labor union movement in the wake of the Great Depression.  After suffering a 
significant setback in the few years  following the Manchurian invasion, the labor 
movement revived  in the  mid-1930s as the labor market became tighter with the 
progress of the upswing, and also as the political impact of the invasion faded, only to 
be crushed again by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937.
22 
Panel C also shows that an autonomous surge of domestic demand occurred to 
support recovery in the mid-1930s, when both the wage and Takahashi’s policy shocks 
were losing momentum.  The broad comovement of the domestic demand component 
and the two indices of investment activity as seen  in Figure 4 indicates that domestic 
demand shocks largely reflected investment demand fluctuations.  The mid-1930s was 
the years when key laws were enacted to foster heavy industries, including petroleum 
and automobile, as seen above.  This suggests that behind the investment upswing was 
the introduction of industrial policy. 
While the output decomposition results shown as Figure 3 are obtained by 
estimating a VAR system putting output before real wage, reversing the ordering does 
not affect the outcome significantly.  The  opposite ordering delivered output 
                                                                 
21 Fukai, Kaiko Nana Junen, p.307. 
22  Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy, chapter 11.   21 
decomposition, where the impact of wage shocks is a bit larger and that of domestic 
demand  shocks correspondingly smaller.  Using real, rather than nominal, money 
supply gave broadly similar results. 
Comparing the three panels (minding that they are somewhat differently scaled), 
one cannot but be impressed by the prominent role of Takahashi’s fiscal expansion in 
ending the Great Depression in Japan.  The depreciating yen provided some stimuli as 
well, but they were not sufficiently strong to outweigh the contractionary influences 
from the rest of the world.  Offsetting the crowding out effects (resulting from deficit 
financing) by taking over a significant portion of public debt, the Bank of Japan was 
prompted by its inflation scare to monetary contraction via open market operations.  
Nevertheless, all in all, Takahashi’s three policy measures were sufficiently powerful to 
counter the deflationary shock transmitted from the rest of the world.   
The downward wage shocks associated with the rise of fascism contributed 
significantly to the turnaround as well, which appears to have been misinterpreted as 
wage flexibility in some earlier studies.    And an autonomous investment upswing  – 
most likely a consequence of “heavy and chemical industrialization” drive – played an 
important part in sustaining the upswing in 1934 and 1935.   Finally, world recovery 




The conventional tale about the early and rapid recovery of the Japanese economy   22 
from the Great Depression praises the Keynesian remedies -- depreciation and fiscal and 
monetary expansion  -- applied by the Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi several 
years before John Maynard Keynes’  General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money was published.  A pplying v ector autoregression analysis  to previously 
unexploited monthly data, this paper confirmed that Takahashi saved Japan from the 
Great Depression.  In particular, his deficit spending was found to have been crucial in 
ending the depression quickly.  Financing a major portion of the deficits by printing 
money, the Bank of Japan was at the same time absorbing liquidity to prevent inflation 
from getting out of control.  Devaluation did help during 1932, but its contribution to 
output growth was modest.   
The Japanese escape led by fiscal expansion is both interesting and unique.  The 
fiscal tool was never relied upon seriously for recovery from the Great Depression in 
other countries.  While the rebound in both Nazi Germany and Sweden owed to some 
extent to expansionary fiscal policy,
23  in both British and U.S. recovery policymakers’ 
contribution (if non-sterilization  of gold inflows could be called as such) was to be 
found in the sphere of monetary policy.
24  Even during the heyday of the Keynesian 
                                                                 
23 While both Germany and Sweden tried fiscal expansion in the 1930s, its importance 
in reversing the downturn remains uncertain.  See Cohn, “Fiscal Policy in Germany,” p. 
340, James, “What is Keynesian About Deficit Financing?” and Pikkanrinen , 
“Keynesianism and the Scandinavian Model of EconomicPolicy.” 
24 Brown, “Fiscal Policy in the Thirties.” Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, pp. 342-47.  
Romer, “What Ended the Great Depression.”    della Paolera and Taylor, “Economic 
Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression.”   23 
economics after the Second World War, fiscal expansion has rarely been implemented 
successfully to pull an economy out of slump.
25   
Why could fiscal expansion be readily and usefully mobilized in interwar Japan?  
This is perhaps an issue for a separate research, but two tentative answers may be 
offered.  First, the Japanese government has never been seriously  bound by the 
ideology of classical liberalism and has almost always believed in mercantilism since 
the Meiji Revolution, as expressed by the slogan  Fukoku Kyohei (a rich country, a 
strong army).  This activist policy stance was advocated and exploited primarily for 
the pork barrel politics practiced by Seiyukai, Takahashi’s party.
26  Although 
Hamaguchi’s party,  Minseito (formerly Kenseikai), attempted to take Japan back on 
gold, the required fiscal and monetary restraint backfired when a devastating earthquake 
occurred in 1923, followed by a widespread banking panic in 1927.  The tradition of 
state interventionism  in Japan  is reflected in the higher share of public spending in 
national income than in other industrialized countries, as well as in the important role 
played by the government in domestic capital formation.
27 
The other important factor may be Takahashi’s reputation as a capable 
                                                                 
25 The tax reduction by Reagan administration in the early 1980s may be one of the rare 
cases, where deficit spending generated substantial demand stimuli for an economy in 
recession.  Also Tamim Bayoumi showed that fiscal policy provided a significant 
boost to the Japanese economy driven into a slump with the collapse of asset prices 
from 1989.  “The Morning After: Explaining the Slowdown in Japanese Growth,” p. 
33. 
26 Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy, chapters 4, 9 and 10.   24 
troubleshooter.  As a vice chancellor of the Bank of Japan, he made himself first 
famous by successful bond sales in London and New York at the time of 
Russo-Japanese war.  Already being Finance Minister for three times and Prime 
Minister once before taking office in December 1931, Takahashi played a pivotal role in 
tiding over two severe financial crises, one from 1920-21 and the other in 1927.
28  His 
personal popularity built upon such track records probably allowed him to stand above 
political bickering and facilitated the implementation  of his life-long belief in 
interventionism. 
Takahashi’s fiscal expansion however is only a part of Japan’s successful 
recovery story.  Both world recovery and the shift to a system of bureaucratic and 
military control played important parts not only in ending the depression, but also in 
sustaining the recovery.  Downward wage shocks were generated to assist the rebound 
in the early 1930s, when the military emerged to dominate Japan’s political scene, 
setting off the shift to a fascist regime.  When the finance minister started to reduce 
deficit spending from 1934, both world recovery and an investment boom took over to 
sustain the growth.  The investment boom most likely was created by industrial policy 
to promote heavy industries, launched by technocrats trusting the superiority of 
bureaucratic over market rationality.   
All in all, it is true that Takahashi’s capable policy response was critical in ending 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
27  See Emi, Zaisei Shishutsu, chapters 1 and 2. 
28 It should however be noted that Takahashi was blamed for creating the asset inflation 
preceding the financial crisis of 1920/21 by expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.   25 
the downswing quickly, but without the intervention of world recovery and political 
regime shift, Japan’s hypothetical growth performance in the 1930s would have been far 
less impressive than actual. 
 
Appendix:  Data Sources 
 
World output: Mattesini and Quintieri, “Italy and the Great Depression: An Analysis of 
the Italian Economy, 1929-1936,” pp. 290-1.   
Export volume: Fujino and Igarashi, Keiki Shisu, pp. 394-5.   
Real government deficits: nominal deficits on the “general account (ippan kaigi)” of the 
central government deflated by wholesale price index.  Nominal deficits are derived by 
deducting monthly revenue from spending (available from Okurasho Nempo) and then 
adding net monthly public debt accumulation (available from Kokusaki Tokei Nempo) . 
High-powered money: Fujino and Igarashi, Keiki Shisu, p. 400-1 
Industrial production: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Juyo Seisan Keppo.   
Real wages: calculated simply by dividing nominal wages (from the Bank of Japan, 
Rodo Tokei Gaisetsu) by wholesale price index for want of a better cost of living index. 
Wholesale Price Index: Bank of Japan, Oroshiuri Bukka Shisu. 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests   
  Level  first difference 
World output  -1.00  -5.25** 
Export volume  -0.84  -11.37** 
Real government deficits  -5.82**  -9.96** 
Money supply  0.43  -9.01** 
Output  0.21  -11.90** 
Real wage  -0.66  -5.79** 
 
Notes:  Tests were undertaken after de-seasonalization and log-transformation;  * and 
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Figure 1  Industrial Production of Major Countries  
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0.0175Figure 3 Decomposition of Output
A. world output and exchange rate shock components









EXCHANGEFigure 3 Decomposition of Output
B. fiscal and money supply shock components











MONEYFigure 3 Decomposition of Output
C. wage and home demand shock components













Sources: Fujino and Igarashi, Keiki Shisu. 
Notes: Volume of planned investment (dotted line) was obtained by deflating the value 
of planned investment with wholesale price index and then lagging by two months.  
Demand component and iron import volume are shown by solid and broken lines, 
respectively.
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